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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
excepted where there was a manifest intention to leave nothing
undisposed of."
The word " surface " has been variously defined, as the mere
vestimentae terrae, the top of the earth and whatsoever is on the
face thereof;s as not the mere plane surface, but all the land
except the mines;7 as the non-mineral portion of the land which
covers and envelopes the minerals ;" and as that portion of the land
which is or may be used for agri6ultural purposes.9
The holding of the West Virginia Court marks a salient depar-
ture from the rule of stare decisis. The case in question overrules
previously adjudicated West Virginia cases and is contrary, not
only to the weight and preponderance, but so far as the writer has
been able to determine, to all the American and English authority
on the point. Without going into the merits of the present tend-
ency of the courts towards a relaxation of the rigid rule of
adherence to precedents as to the law in general, it is certainly
regrettable that the rule should be so clearly violated in the
field of real property, where it has hitherto been rigidly applied
and where it is especially important that vested rights should not
be disturbed.10
The Supreme Court of the United States is definite in laying
down the proposition that a decision overruling a former case does
not come within the consitutional prohibition against impairing
the obligation of contracts, and that the prohibition only applies
to legislative action." Although judicial legislation is not uncon-
stitutional, it is submitted that the courts should be slow to change
the law where contractual or vested rights will be extinguished
thereby.12 -W. B. H.
BUILDING CONTRACTS-ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATE-AVOIDANCE.-
The plaintiff agreed to erect a hotel building in a certain time.
The contract provided for extension of time in case of delay with-
Dolan v. Dolan, supra, note 3.
a Wakefield v. Buccleuch, 36 L. T. Ch. 179, L. R. 4 Eq. 613, (Eng. 1867).
7 Pountney v. Clayton, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 820 (Eng. 1883) ; Dolan V'. Dolan,
supra.
8 Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Neosho County, 75 Kan.
335, 89 Pac. 750, (1907); Big Six Development Co. v,. Mitchell, 138 Fed. 279,
1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332, (U. S. 1905).
) Williams v. South Penn Oil Co., supra.
10 Clarke v. Figgins, 27 W. Va. 670, (1886); Braxton v. Bressler, 64 Ill. 488,
(1872) ; Sweeting v. Sweeting, 10 Jur. N. S. 31 (Eng. 1863) ; 34 HARv. L. REv., 74.
11 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1894).
1 Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437, (1907).
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out fault of the plaintiff and declared that the extended period
should be determined and fixed by the architects. Held, in
the absence of fraud or bad faith, the decision of the architect is
conclusive. Parke v. Pence Springs Co., 118 S. E. 508 (W. Va.).
The point is decided under the rules applicable to contracts to
be performed to the satisfaction of a third party. The courts
differ as to what conduct on the part of the third party in such
case will justify the setting aside of his decision. By the strict
English rule, when the contract has made the production of an
architect's certificate a condition precedent to payment, a failure
to produce the certificate will be excused only where the defend-
ant's own act, as collusion with the architect, has prevented.
Batterbury v. Vyse, 2 H. & C. 42. In the United States recovery
is generally allowed on the contract without acceptance by the
architect or other party designated as arbiter if he act fraudu-
lently or in bad faith. North American Ry. Const. Co. v. McMath
Surveying Go., 116 Fed. 169; Utah Const. Co. v. St. Louis etc.
Equipment Co., 254 Fed. 321; Foster v. McKeown, 192 Ill. 339,
61 N. E. 514; Hebert v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 77 N. E. 822.
Some courts in the United States have gone even further, and
hold that the architect will not be permitted to act arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Scully v. United States, 197 Fed. 327; Nolan v.
Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Cranch v. Guttman, 134 N. Y. 45, 31 N.
E. 271; Crilly v. Rinhn Co., 135 Ill. App. 198; Taft v. Whitney,
85 Wash. 389, 148 Pac. 43; Johnson & Grommet Bros. v. Bunn &
Monterio, 114 Va. 222, 76 S. E. 310; but see Richmond v. Burton,
115 Va. 206, 78 S. E. 560. In the principal case the court cites
Plumbing Co. v. Carr, 54 W. Va. 272, 46 S. E. 458, and Barrett
v. Coal Co., 51 W. Va. 416, 41 S. E. 220. These cases hold that
where performance of a contract is to be to the satisfaction of a
third party the reasons for a rejection by that party cannot be
investigated if he act in good faith and not fraudulently. The
West Virginia court then seems to be in line with the majority
American opinion. It, however, has drawn one distinction or
permitted one exception. In an action on a contract providing that
construction of a building should be to the satisfaction of an archi-
tect and according to plans furnished by the architect the court
said, "Arbitrary, capricious or palpably unreasonable refusal,
on the part of the architect, to accept, are, facts sufficient to
justify a jury in setting aside, overthrowing or ignoring an archi-
tect's decision." The case is distinguished from Plumbing Co.
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WEST YIBGINIA LAW QUABTELY
v. Carr and Barrett v. Goal Co., supra, on the grounds that it is a
working contract, entailing expense of preparation and permitting
large expenditures in execution before determination of disputes.
Berry v. Temple Association, 80 W. Va. 342, 93 S. E. 355.
-R. M. M.
DomEsTic RELATIONs-AImATION OF AFFECTIONS--REcVERY
FOR PARTIAL AImNAoON-M OT E.-A'S wife left him for cause,
and was living apart. A was attempting to effect a reconciliation,
and B, who was on intimate terms with A's wife, was partly
instrumental in persuading her to seek a divorce. A sues B for
alienation of his wife's affections. Held, A can recover if B pre-
vented a resumption of marital relations. The fact that the wife's
affections were at least partially alienated before B's intervention
does not prevent A's recovery for partial alienation of his wife's
affections. Rush v. Buckles, 117 S. E. 130 (W. Va. 1923).
This case, while reversed on grounds of error in the trial court,
propounds a rule that has been established as law in several other
states, under similar circumstances. It is a well-settled rule that
a husband can recover from a third party for the alienation of his
wife's affections. Gross v. Gross, 70 W. Va. 317, 73 S. E. 961;
Ratcliffe v. Walker, 117 Va. 569, 85 S. E. 575; Nichols v. Nichols,
147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947; Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322, 85 Atl.
620, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332. And a famous W4issouri ease is
authority for the statement that complete alienation is not neces-
sary but that if the defendant had induced plaintiff's husband to
withdraw from her his support and affection, no secret affection
he might still retain for her would defeat her cause of action.
Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947. That case, as
setting a precedent for the decision in the principal case, is directly
in point. A further development of the same general principle is
illustrated by the rule that even if the wife had no affection for
her husband at the time of the suit, recovery would be allowed,
for the defendant should not have interfered to cut off all chance
for the husband to revive his wife's affections. Dallas v. Sellers,
17 Ind. 479, 79 Am. Dec. 489; Van Vocter v. McKillip, 7 Blackf.
(Ind.) 578. This rule was quoted with approval by the court of
another jurisdiction, which added that "As to the claim that there
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